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CASE COMMENTS
LIABILITY TO BYSTANDERS AT ACCIDENTS
FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
Traditionally, in negligence actions the unforeseen plaintiff' has
had very little success in American and English courts. This is
particularly true of the bystander who witnesses a vehicular accident
and experiences severe emotional shock and mental distress from
seeing the sudden injury and, perhaps, violent deaths of the accident
victims.2 In refusing to permit recovery for the physical injuries result-
ing from the strain to his nervous system, the courts are in general
agreement that there is no duty of care owed by the tort-feasor to the
bystander.3
Only limited exceptions have been made to this traditional rule.
Recovery has been permitted when the plaintiff has been able to
demonstrate that his injury was the result of some actual physical
impact.4 Other more liberal courts have held the defendant liable
"The unforeseen plaintiff is a person who could not have been reasonably
expected to be injured by a particular act. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
-See Southern Ry. v, Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Resavage v. Davies,
199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Jelley v. Laflame, - N.H. -, 238 A.2d 728
(1968); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Nuckles v. Tennessee
Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 6i1, 299 S.W. 775 (1927); Waube v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92 (1942); RsTrATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965). Contra, Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d
582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964); see Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473,
58 So. 927 (1912); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (C.A. 1924).
3Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 6o3, 258 N. W. 497, 501 (1935); King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 435
(C.A.).
This comment is not concerned with the situation where there is no resulting
physical injury, and damage is claimed only for mental distress or shock.
tThe "impact" exception came about as the result of leaving it an open question
in Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 226 (P.C. 1888). There
must be some physical contact with the plaintiff before he can recover damages
for mental distress injuries in jurisdictions following the impact exception. Spade
v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, al-
though characterizing the limits of the exception as arbitrary, felt that such
definite limits on recoverable mental distress claims were necessary. Homans v.
Boston El. Ry., i8o Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902). When the exception became
diluted to the point that otherwise unnoticed or insignificant touchings were term-
ed "impact," most courts chose to lay aside the exception altogether and to base
recovery on the zone-of-danger exception. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,
21 A.2d 402 (1941); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329,
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for the plaintiff's resultant injuries when the plaintiff was found to
be in the zone of danger at the scene of the accident.5
In the recent case of Dillon v. Legg6 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia reevaluated the traditional rule of no recovery and chose to
disregard it in order to permit recovery by a plaintiff who did not
fall within the scope of the zone-of-danger exception. The facts of
Dillon were not extraordinary. Under the watchful eye of their
mother, Erin and Cheryl Dillon, minor sisters, were crossing a street
at an intersection. Erin, who was in the lead, was run over by an
automobile driven by the defendant. Mrs. Dillon was in close proxi-
mity to the accident, but she was not in the path of the automobile
and not in danger of being struck by the vehicle.
The emotional shock arising from seeing Erin killed resulted in
physical injuries to the nervous systems of both the surviving sister
and the mother. Mrs. Dillon brought an action against the driver of
the vehicle to recover damages for the physical injuries to her nervous
system.7 Defendant's motion for a summary judgment on the plead-
ings was granted on the ground that Mrs. Dillon was clearly not
within the zone of danger.
The Supreme Court of California in a four-to-three decision re-
versed the trial court. The majority found that the chance of fraud
in mental distress claims and the possible inability to fix definite limits
of liability for the courts to follow in the future should not prevent
a deserving plaintiff from seeking compensation for his injuries. The
15o A. 540 (1930); Battalla v. State, 1o N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34 (g6i). Contra, Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
1 The "zone-of-danger" exception is generally followed in the United States. See
Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965); Battalla v. State, io
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 72!9, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., - Vt. -, 234 A.2d 656 (1967); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273
Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); 10 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 267 (1953). The basis of the exception is that the plaintiff may recover
for resultant injuries from mental distress when they are caused by fears for his
own safety while endangered by the defendant's negligent act. Some jurisdictions
permit the plaintiff to recover for resultant injuries which have been caused by
concern for others who were also in the zone. Currie v. Wordrop, [19271 Sess.
Cas. 538, 550-51 (Scot.); see Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918);
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). Other states, however, confine
recovery to that part of the total injury which was brought on by fears for
personal safety only. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149, 152 (1959);
see Duet v. Cheramie, 176 So.2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
(I- Cal. 2d -, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
7A second count brought by Mrs. Dillon for the wrongful death of Erin and
a third count brought by Cheryl for mental distress injuries to her nervous system
were not the subject of this appeal.
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court advanced three criteria to be used as a basis for weighing the
merits of future claims. The factors to be looked at are:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
.... (2) Whether the shock resulted ... from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident .... (8) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related .... 8
The dissenting opinion stressed the "injustice to California de-
fendants flowing from such a disproportionate extension of their
liability. .. ."9 It also said that the criteria suggested for the use of
future courts are of little value. "Upon analysis, their seeming cer-
tainty evaporates into arbitrariness, an [sic] inexplicable distinctions
appear."' 0
Dillon represents the first time that the highest court of a state
has found a duty owing to a bystander who could not have recovered
under either the impact or zone-of-danger exceptions. The conclusion
reached by earlier courts that no duty was owed to the bystander was
based on grounds of either foreseeability" or public policy' 2 or
of both.'
3
Duty is often expressed in terms of foreseeability.14 To determine
whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, it is neces-
sary to find that the defendant must have reasonably foreseen a risk
of some harm to this particular plaintiff or to others in the same
class of persons.' 5
When the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff is
more than that of merely tort-feasor to bystander, a few jurisdictions
'441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 8o.
While sitting on the District Court of Appeals of California, Justice Tobriner
had decided Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel g: Supply Co., - Cal. App. -, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) for the plaintiff on almost identical facts as Dillon.
The Amaya case, however, when it reached the supreme court, was reversed.
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963). Justice Tobriner in Dillon is now in the unique position of
being able to overrule the case which had reversed his landmark decision of six
years before.
0441 P.2d at 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
0l1d. at 926, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
nE.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Waube v. Warring-
ton, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935); King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.13. 429
(C.A.).
"E.g., Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453, 458 (D. Ore. 1962); Jelley v.
Laflame, - N.H. -, 238 A.2d 728, 729-30 (1968).
13Wauhe v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 6o3, 258 N.W. 497 (935)-
"'See cases cited note ii supra, and note 14 infra.
'Angst v. Great Northern Ry., 131 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Minn. 1955); Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928); Bourhill v. Young,
[1943] A.C. 92, 98 (1942).
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have found the physical injuries emanating from the shock of seeing
another harmed to be foreseeable. 16 The facts common to these cases
are that the plaintiff and victim were close relatives, and that the de-
fendant had actual knowledge of their presence and of their close
relationship before the accident occurred. In addition to the actual
knowledge, a special duty to take care may have been imposed as the
result of a contract between the defendant on the one hand and the
plaintiff and victim on the other.'7 Thus, when hospital attendants
kept a patient in a room with a defective window which permitted the
rain to beat in during a storm and the patient thereafter contracted and
died of pneumonia, the patient's husband was permitted to recover
damages from the hospital for the mental distress injury he suffered
from seeing his wife's health fail.' 8
Harm to automobile accident spectators resulting from mental
distress has not been deemed foreseeable in the past because mental
distress from the visual observation of accidents is not usually severe
enough to result in physical injuries.19
The driver of a car or vehicle, even though careless, is entitled
to assume that the ordinary frequenter of the streets has suf-
ficient fortitude to endure such incidents as may from time to
time be expected to occur in them, including the noise of a
collision and the sight of injury to others, and is not to be con-
sidered negligent towards one who does not possess the custom-
ary phlegm.
20
Although the plaintiff's particular injury may not have been fore-
seen, his claim would not have been defeated in American courts if
some other harm were also threatened. 2 ' However, as a practical
matter, the plaintiff could not say some other harm was threatened
where he was not in direct danger of being struck, and he was left
with only an unforeseeable injury caused by the shock of seeing some-
1 Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, go S.E. 809 (1916); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Coopwood, 96 S.V. 1o2 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o6); Boardman v. Sanderson, [1964]
i W.L.R. 1317 (C.A. 1961); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
'7Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E. 809 (1916); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Coopwood, 96 S.W. 1o2 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o6); cf. Rasmussen v. Benson, 135
Neb. 251, 280 N.W. 890 (1938); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
"$Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 9o S.E. 8og (1916).
"Angst v. Great Northern Ry., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955).
2Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92, 117 (1942).
"See Parris v. M.A. Bruder & Sons, 261 F. Supp. 4o6 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Shipley
v. City of Pittsburgh, 321 Pa. 494, 184 A. 671 (1936); cf. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty
Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
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one else in danger; therefore, the general rule of no recovery was
applied.
22
Foreseeability is not the only obstruction the bystander has to
overcome in order to recover. Strong public policy considerations
have made it difficult for many courts to acknowledge that a duty
of care is owed to a plaintiff who claims injuries resulting from mental
distress.2 3 These courts have focused attention both on the problems
of proper administration of justice and on the utility or social value
of the interests involved.
From an administrative point of view, there is caution when deal-
ing with mental distress claims because the chance of fraud or
fabrication may be high.24 However, Dillon makes it clear that
although the possibility of fraud exists in some cases, it is not a
valid basis for denying or preventing recovery by plaintiffs who have
suffered real and provable injury.25
In balancing the rights of an injured bystander against the burden
that defending such claims of mental distress would have on the users
of highways, it is felt that the hardship would be too great for the
driver if liability were extended to those beyond the zone of anticipat-
ed, direct physical danger.26 The driver's act was not culpable enough
for the spectator to recover.27 Furthermore, it is felt that recovery
should be withheld from all bystanders with mental distress claims
because once recovery is granted to one such member of this class of
persons there is no apparent or logical stopping place, and courts
will be unable to prevent recovery on more remote claims in the
future.28
The Dillon court recognized the difficulties that the earlier courts
-27he courts deal with this as not being in the zone of danger. E.g., Waube
v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
Cases cited note 12 supra.
21E.g., Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966); 'Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
-"[T]he possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated
cases does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that
potentiality arises." 441 P.2d at 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
2 Resavage v. Davies, igg Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (1952); Cote v. Litawa,
96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792, 795 (1950).
!"E.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,
525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497, 501 (1935).
2Angst v. Great Northern Ry., 131 F. Supp. 156, 159-6o (D. Minn. 1955);
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 523-24, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 43-44 (1963); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 163-64
(C.A. 1924) (dissenting opinion).
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had in finding a duty to the bystander under the foreseeability test
and on public policy grounds. It, therefore, advanced three factors to
determine if the defendant would be liable to the bystander: (1) the
nearness of the bystander to the accident, (2) the extent of the by-
stander's sensory involvement with the accident, and (3) the closeness
of the relationship between the victim and the bystander.20 To recover
under these criteria, Mrs. Dillon did not have to show that she had
been threatened by some other injury. But the court did not extend
liability for mental distress injuries to all bystanders at automobile
accidents. Rather, it recognized that the chances of any two bystanders
suffering from mental distress are not equal. With respect to some
members of the class of bystanders, the chance of injury was found
to be high enough to say that it was foreseeable.30 By limiting the
number of foreseeable plaintiffs under these three criteria, the court
has also answered the public policy considerations which barred re-
covery in the earlier cases. If the injury resulting from the defendant's
act is foreseeable, then his act is sufficiently culpable for him to pay
for the damage caused. In addition, if liability is to be extended no
further than to the persons covered by the criteria, the fear of un-
limited claims in the future may be assuaged.
The relative weight of each of these three factors will be determined
by the fact situation of each new case. Once the weight of each factor
is determined, the court must balance them all to see if the plaintiff's
claim is foreseeable. For example, the claim of a physical injury from
shock by the mother of the accident victim is more probable than
the same claim from a distant relative. When weighing each of these
claims, the mother's claim would be given greater weight, and if all
other factors were equal, her claim might prevail where that of the
distant relative might not. The Dillon court made no attempt to find
where the balance should be struck. Instead, it suggested the three
tests to be made and specifically left it to future courts to determine
2 'The specific language of the court was:
(i) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as con-
trasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learn-
ing of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
441 P.2d at 92o, 69 Cal. Rptr. at So.
30d.
